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Abstract
The article explores the role that subjective evidence of causality and
associated counterfactuals and counterpotentials might play in the social
sciences where comparative cases are scarce. This scarcity rules out statis-
tical inference based upon frequencies and usually invites in-depth ethno-
graphic studies. Thus, if causality is to be preserved in such situations, a
conception of ethnographic causal inference is required. Ethnographic
causality inverts the standard statistical concept of causal explanation in
observational studies, whereby comparison and generalization, across a
sample of cases, are both necessary prerequisites for any causal inference.
Ethnographic causality allows, in contrast, for causal explanation prior to any
subsequent comparison or generalization.
Keywords
causality, ethnography, Bayesian narratives, counterfactuals, counterpotentials
1 London School of Economics and Political Sciences, London, United Kingdom
2De Montfort University, Leicester, United Kingdom
Corresponding Author:
Ofer Engel, De Montfort University, Gateway House, GH5.72, The Gateway, Leicester LE1
9BH, United Kingdom.
Email: ofer.engel@dmu.ac.uk
Sociological Methods & Research
1-21
ª The Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0049124119852373
journals.sagepub.com/home/smr
This article explores the role that subjective statements about causality and
their associated subjective counterfactuals and counterpotentials[AQ2]
may be allowed to play in the social sciences, where ethnographic tech-
niques and the “social construction” of causality are appropriately invoked.
The background to this exploration is the theory of Bayesian narratives
(Abell 1987, 2009a, 2009b), where subjective statements may be used as
evidential items (amongst others) in Bayesian causal inference. Such infer-
ences are required when frequency-based statistical approaches are impos-
sible because of limited numbers of comparative cases (units of analysis)
and a singular ethnographic concept of causality must inevitably be
deployed in each case. Any subsequent limited generalization, usually
across a small number of cases, will place causal inference (explanation)
as logically prior to both comparison and generalization. Ethnographic
researchers usually suggest that “justified belief,” rather than “objective
truth” (Cardano 2009), is generated in social interactions between the
observed informant and the ethnographer.1 The inquiry will be pursued
with this in mind.
The concept of causality is, of course, itself controversial among ethno-
graphers, many of whom seek to disavow the concept altogether, remaining
content with “an understanding of the meaning of human actions” which is
largely conceived as a descriptive exercise which rejects “why questions”
(Small 2013). Nevertheless, Abend, Petrie, and Sauder (2013) find that many
ethnographic studies do entertain some concept of causality though the pre-
cise method of establishing a causal inference from ethnographic data
remains rather difficult to fathom. In addition, the extensive literature on
qualitative, small-N case–based research has engaged with concepts of caus-
ality but almost invariably in a comparative perspective where N > 1 and
where the language of variables (if only nominal dichotomies) is resorted to
(Mahoney, 2000, 2012; Mahoney et al. 2013; Ragin 1987). In this article, we
concentrate upon situations which ethnographers might wish to describe as
unique and where the logic of comparison across cases is initially absent. If a
concept of causality can be found which is reasonably faithful to the precepts
of ethnography, then surely it should be explored to enable explanatory
studies (Elman, Gerring, and Mahoney 2016; Rohlfing 2013). Such enable-
ment will inevitably require us to discard the standard explanatory procedure,
whereby comparison across cases is a necessary prerequisite for any causal
explanation. Indeed, in so far as comparison may be involved, the approach
developed in this article places it as posterior to the prior establishment of a
causal explanation in each comparator (Abell 2009a). We have adopted the
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term ethnographic causality in the full recognition that some would want to
name the procedure alternatively.
Here, we adopt what may be called a “mechanism approach” to caus-
ality, whereby human activity provides the causal connection (motor
energy) between the causal and outcome/effect states (Goldthorpe 2001;
Hedstro¨m 2005). We, thus, examine causal links (designated as an arrow:
!) which take the general form Xc ! DXo ! Y , where both Xc and Y
may comprise sets of conjunctions of events,  stands for a specified actor
(individual/collective), and DXo describes an action or forbearance
designed to bring about Y .2 Causal links of this sort may then be strung
together in narratives. It should be clear that, despite the similarity in
expression, the term DXo is not an application of Pearl’s (2009) hugely
influential, do-calculus, whereby the causes of DXo would be held constant
in the DAG[AQ3] structure.
Nevertheless, there is an immediate parallel between the formulation
Xc ! DXo ! Y and the treatment of intervening mediator variables
X ! M ! Y in the large-N tradition. Furthermore, using Pearl’s (2009)
backdoor criterion, independent mediator variables have the marked virtue
that, while they can protect the causal interpretation of the covariation
between X and Y from ubiquitous unmeasured confounders of X and Y,
though they cannot so protect against confounders of X and M, and M Y
(Rubin 2005). It might prove constructive to see how ethnographic causality
might contribute to causal inference when this is the case.3
The extensive debates in various literatures about the nature of causal
inference have often been limited to the context of a large-N frequency
framework. Breaking with this tradition in the direction of what we may
cautiously call singular causality is full of hazards. This may account for the
fact that a small-N concept of causality, consistent with “uniqueness”
N ¼ 1, has not been forthcoming in the literature.4 Furthermore, this has
stymied the interplay of small and large-N studies where case studies are
designed to act as a hand maiden to frequency-based studies.
The article will proceed as follows. Firstly, the nature of subjective causal,
counterfactual, and counterpotential statements is briefly reviewed. Sec-
ondly, a small illustrative (and only illustrative) empirical study is intro-
duced. Thirdly, Bayesian narratives are briefly outlined. Fourthly, the
process of Bayesian inference to credible beliefs is examined. Fifthly, the
inference through credible beliefs to causal connections is outlined. Sixthly,
the conception of meta-ethnography is introduced. Then, the illustrative
empirical study is reintroduced and finally the article briefly concludes.
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Subjective Causal, Counterfactual, and
Counterpotential Statements
Assume an observer/ethnographer elicits statements from an actor about her
or his completed action, namely doing Xo, as follows:
(1) “I did Xo because of Xc to realize Y” (a subjective first person
singular causally related statement) and
(2) “I would not have done Xo (i.e., forborne to do Xo) to realize Y, if
Xc had not happened” (a singular first person subjective
counterfactual).5
Alternatively, the ethnographer might elicit information, from the actor
about his or her future anticipated course of action as follows:
(3) “If Xc happens, then I will do Xo to realize Y,”
(4) “If Xc does not happen, then I will not do (forbear to do) Xo to
realize Y.”
Both Xc and Y may comprise of more or less complex descriptions,
which are proffered in the actor’s own descriptive language (discourse)
which we may assume will be derived from his or her own cultural
heritage.6 The statements (1)–(4) may also reflect the actor’s uncertainty
and consequently be expressed in a probabilistic form. Furthermore, state-
ments may also derive, not from the actor commissioning the action, but
from alternative informants claiming information about the focal action,
which will generate subjective statements along the lines of “because of
Xc he or she did Xo to realize Y,” “because of Xcwe did Xo to realize Y ,”
and “because of Xc they did Xo to realize Y .” In addition, corresponding
counterfactual versions of these statements may also be elicited. All these
various statements may also be tensed.
The key logical point is that subjective elicitation apparently surren-
ders information about both the cause and counterfactual for the same unit
of analysis, namely the actor commissioning the action. In this respect, if
credibility can be ascertained, there is a clear advantage of such data over
much comparative statistical data in many observational studies where
intra-unit comparisons are not possible; though Pearl’s (2009) do-calculus
does provide a route to intra-unit counterfactuals.
The problem we face is: under what assumptions may an analyst, who
might or might not be the ethnographer, allow elicited subjective state-
ments to stand as credible evidence for a justified retro-predictive belief
that:
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(5) Xc caused the actor to do Xo ðDXoÞ which caused Y.
Or prediction that:
(6) Xc will cause the actor to do Xo ðDXoÞ which will cause Y.
It is important to note that, from an ethnographic standpoint, the sub-
jective evidence, namely the causal and counterfactual statements them-
selves, must explicitly be associated with a specified ethnographer.
Ethnographic principles require an acknowledgment that the informant’s
statements are generated by virtue of the social interaction of the infor-
mant and ethnographer, wherein the credibility of the informant and the
informant’s statements come to be assessed by the ethnographer. Clearly,
how and why ethnographers assign credibility is a complex issue which
warrants further attention.
Several points of initial clarification should be made. Firstly, some
ethnographers would immediately cavil at the inferences to causality
between set Xc and DXo suggesting that voluntary actions and causality
are logically incompatible. However, we may assume that the above
subjective statements can, in principle, be supplemented by subjective
counterpotential statements which run as follows:
(7) “I (she and he, we, etc.) could have not done Xo (forborne to do Xo)
if Xc,”
(8) “I (she or he, we, etc.) could have done Xo if not Xc.”
Similarly, the future tense statements can also be accompanied by coun-
terpotentials. We may assume that counterpotentials preserve the voluntary
nature of human action whilst maintaining the possibility of an inference to
causality. That is to say, though informants can speak of why actors did/will
do Xo (forbear to do Xo), they fully recognize that the actor could always
have done (may do) otherwise.
The attraction of the various subjective statements outlined above is that
they can all apparently be acquired by an ethnographer relating to a specific
action (forbearance). Thus, if they are mutually understood by an ethnographer
and an informant and deemed as credible by the former, they open a route (albeit
only probabilistic) to causal inference without the need to generalize across
comparative units. That is to say, as we have noted above, causality can then,
in principle, be justified in the absence of comparators and statistical covaria-
tion. This allows that single case studies may, if handled carefully, surrender
causal information and causality (explanation) may then be generalized by
comparing a number of cases. The procedure is only appropriate when the
numberof cases falls short of a statistical sample.Everythingdepends, however,
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upon the credibility afforded to the subjective statements. How should they be
elicited and then treated as credible evidence for a justified causal inference?
Under what conditions may we assume the informant understands what
the causes and objectives of his own and others actions are and is able to
impart this understanding to the ethnographer in virtue of the elicitation of
subjective statements? Certainly, if the vocabulary in which the elements of
sets Xc and Y are expressed is that of the informant, then this is more likely
to be the case and ethnographic principle enjoins precisely this as the starting
point for any research. Scepticism always remains, however, as to whether
social scientists can assume a causal understanding, among informants, of
their own and others’ actions. This scepticism may be particularly acute in
respect of the counterfactuals and counterpotentials. Do people know what
they and others would have done in the absence of Xc and are they capable of
conveying this information to the ethnographer?
If we switch to prediction rather than retrodiction, then things are not quite
as bleak because the ethnographer can treat subjective statements as predic-
tive and test this assumption if and when appropriate circumstances arise.
Nevertheless, the conditions under which subjective causal, counterfactual,
and counterpotential statements can be relied upon as sources of credible
evidence are far from transparent. Furthermore, when multiple ethnographers
are introduced alongside multiple informants into the mix, then the problems
of comparing the likely varying elicited statements, with a view to compen-
dious causal inference, clearly exacerbates the inferential problems. We hope
to take these issues up in a subsequent paper.
An Illustrative Empirical Example: An Initial Look
We introduce here an illustrative empirical example which will be explored
in more detail later in the article.7 In a study of producer cooperatives in
developing countries, explanations were sought as to why many failed,
whereas very few prospered (Abell 1990). Attempts to find a statistical
model to account for this asymmetric distribution, which was generalizable
across cases proved elusive. To put it succinctly, each case appeared to be
rather historically unique and a subsequent in-depth study of a single highly
successful cooperative lead to the theory of Bayesian narratives (below).
Here, we concentrate upon a single action, whereby the collective governing
board appointed an external professional manager. A senior member of the
governing body was asked the question, after a great deal of exploratory
discussion, “why was an independent manager appointed?”8 The answer
(while improving the expressed English) was as follows:
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Because sales were dropping, the quality of the products was not competitive,
and the problems of discipline were uncontrolled, a manager was appointed to
improve the all-round performance whilst making the cooperative an attractive
place to work.
SetXc ¼ fXc1;Xc2;Xc3g
Xc1 ¼ sales dropping,
Xc2 ¼ uncompetitive quality of products,
Xc3 ¼ discipline problems,
DXo ¼ appoint an independent manager.
SetY ¼ fY1;Y2g
Y1 ¼ improve all round performance,
Y2 ¼ attractive place to work.
It is important to recognize that this statement was mutually constructed in
the interaction of the ethnographer/author and the informant and was
endorsed by the informant as a correct and an acceptable causal explanation
of the action taken and its outcome. The author/ethnographer was now faced
with equation 1 assessing the credibility of this statement and equation 2
inferring causality.
Thus, the possible causal inference takes the form:
fXc1;Xc2;Xc3g ! Governing bodyDXo ! fY1; Y2g:
where the author of DXo is a collective actor, namely, the governing
body, which appointed a manager to improve performance and the attrac-
tiveness of the workplace. When faced with this inferred causality, an infor-
mant member of the governing body (with prompting) stated,
If falling sales, uncompetitive products and discipline problems had not been
the case then we (the governing body) would not have appointed an indepen-
dent manager
Namely, he proffered a subjective counterfactual. Data on counterpoten-
tials were unfortunately not gathered. Additional informant statements will
be introduced later in the article.
Bayesian Narratives
A narrative (Abell 1987, 2009b) comprises a time distributed a-cyclic
directed “and-digraph” (and-DAG) constructed from multiple causal
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connections of the form Xc ! DXo ! Y , where the components of set Xc
comprise the in-degree nodes running into the DXo node and the Y nodes its
out-degree. Bayesian narratives are generated by providing subjective evi-
dence of the sort outlined above, for each of the complex, action generated,
causal links in the narrative. Many of the causal links may involve placing
prior actions into set Xc and posterior actions into set Y , thus capturing the
notion of social interaction. Xc and Y may then be connected by a single or
multiple directed paths of actions thus generating Xc ! narrative ! Y .
First, note that subjective statements examined above refer to both the
complex conjunctions of events Xc and Y and their causally generative
connecting mechanism—they come as of a piece. However, the evidence
will usually bear only an uncertain probabilistic relationship with the exis-
tence of the generative causal mechanism. All will depend upon the cred-
ibility of the subjective statements, afforded by informants, in the
ethnographers’ estimations.9
Subjective evidence will be available for each action under investigation.
The assembly of sets Xc and Y , constructed from the subjective causal
statements, to a degree contrasts with procedures in most case studies (and
process tracing; Mahoney 2012) which are usually constructed by initially
assembling a chronology of events and subsequently searching for grounds to
insert causal connections. The events are accordingly often assembled with-
out initial recourse to an elucidation of actions/interactions which generate
them. The procedure advocated here, however, affords primacy to the
“understanding of human actions,” in the sense of what occasions them and
what their objectives are. The understanding of human actions is, of course,
an objective promoted by most ethnographers.
The important point to note is that from an ethnographic standpoint the
initial causal/counterfactual subjective statements are elicited as evidential
material during the social interaction of the informants and the identified
ethnographers. That is to say, the inferences are socially constructed cre-
ating posterior beliefs on the ethnographer’s behalf, given the perceived
credibility of the evidential statements. The degree of credibility, once
established by an ethnographer, will constitute a prior for an inference to
the hypothesis that there is justified belief in the generative causal link
between sets Xc and Y.
Ethnographic practitioners are assiduous in recording (producing text)
charting the details of such interactions and inferences. They would no doubt
label this record, if pursued with due diligence, as charting the social con-
struction of the belief (or disbelief) in the credibility of the informants state-
ment and then to justified belief in the causal link.
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We need eventually to place this procedure within the framework of
Bayesian inference. First, however, the causal states which are members of
sets Xc and Y must be extracted from the subjective causal statements pro-
vided by a number of informants, and perhaps also more than one ethnogra-
pher. However, in this introductory paper, we will concentrate upon a single
ethnographer with multiple informants though the penultimate section will
briefly introduce meta-ethnography.
The members of the causal set, Xc, and outcome set Ymay, however, both
vary across informants. Then to what extent is there agreement amongst the
informants about the states/nodes in, respectively, both sets Xc and Y? If
agreement or near agreement across informants fails, then how should the
ethnographers proceed? One possibility is to treat each informants’ sets as an
independent estimates of Xc ! DXo ! Y . Alternatively, a threshold may be
set of the number of informants’ endorsements required for a cause to be
included in set Xc and likewise an outcome in set Y (see below on meta-
ethnography).
The analysis, thus, enables answers to be given, in a systematic manner, as
to whether a particular causal or outcome state is sufficiently endorsed by the
informants to be included in, respectively, sets Xc and Y which are to be
subjected to the Bayesian inference.10
Bayesian Inference to Credible Beliefs
Consider the causal linkage between sets Xc and Y: Xc ! DXo ! Y . Let si
stand for the conjunction of subjective causal and counterfactual statements
elicited from an informant/actor i, by ethnographer e. Then let:
Be ¼ e0s prior belief in the credibility of subjective statements elicited
from informants,
c Be ¼ e0s prior disbelief in the credibility of subjective statements eli-
cited from informants.11
Given si, then by Bayes’ rule.
12
PðBejsiÞ
Pð c BejsiÞ
¼ PðBeÞ
Pð c BeÞ
 PðsijBeÞ
Pðsij c BeÞ
; ð1Þ
OddsðBe : c BejsiÞ ¼ OddsðBe : c BeÞ  Lsi ; ð2Þ
log

OddsðBe : c BejsiÞ

¼ log

OddsðBe : c BeÞ

þ logðLsiÞ; ð3Þ
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where Lsi is the likelihood ratio (estimated by e) of the evidence si given
Be and c Be. That is,
Lsi ¼
PðsijBeÞ
Pðsij c BeÞ
: ð4Þ
Thus, from e’s prior odds and estimation of the likelihood ratio Lsi , his or
her posterior odds in the belief about credibility of i’s statement can be
derived on a log interval scale (Abell 2009b; Schum 1994). Note that what-
ever the prior beliefs happen to be, if Lsi is greater than 1, then the posterior
beliefs are strengthened and vice versa.
If, however, we set the prior odds at unity, which some ethnographers
appear, by implication so to do, then the likelihood ratio is numerically equal
to the posterior odds.13 In this situation, e has merely to estimate her or his
likelihood ratio. Estimation of this nature might still appear rather demand-
ing of the ethnographer. If, however, the estimate is reported alongside an
explicit statement of si itself, nothing is lost and something may be gained.
Ethnographers, at this juncture, might still cavil—wherein lies the ben-
efit in making this probabilistic estimate rather than merely reporting si
which would be the standard practice? The answer is that there may be
ethnographers, other than e, eliciting statements from i and then the
question arises as to how their, likely differing beliefs, in the credibility
of i’s statements should be combined?14 If in addition there are multiple
informants, then how should each of their statements be combined? It is
clear that a systematic procedure is required that enables combinations
across ethnographers and informants. Placing things on probabilistic scale
helps considerably in this respect. The procedure can be reported in a
transparent manner such that any audience for the research can appreciate
how the conclusion was drawn, which is currently scarcely the case in many
ethnographic studies (Abend et al. 2013).
Let us stay with a single ethnographer e, but now introduce m con-
junctive, subjective statements si1; si2; . . . ; sim, deriving from m infor-
mants observing/witnessing DXo. Initially, assume that each informant
provides the subjective statements independently of each other. So, e can
assume that the statements are independently elicited conditional on Be and
c Be. Then:
PðBejsi1; . . . ; simÞPðsi1Þ . . . PðsimÞ ¼ PðBeÞPðsi1jBeÞ . . . PðsimjBeÞ
Pð c Bejsi1; . . . ; simÞPðsi1Þ . . . PðsimÞ ¼ Pð c BeÞPðsi1j c BeÞ . . . Pðsimj c BeÞ :
ð5Þ
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The log odds of ei’s beliefs about the credibility of informants’ m
statements will take the form:
logðoddsðBe : c Bejsi1; . . . ; simÞÞ ¼ log

oddsðBe : c BeÞÞ þ logðLSÞ;
ð6Þ
where logðLSÞ ¼
Pm
i¼1logðLsiÞ. Once again, adopting the ethnographic
precept, we may cautiously assume that the prior odds can be set at unity.
If this is feasible, the posterior odds are then equal to the likelihood ratio ðLSÞ
and e can estimate the posterior odds directly rather than inferring such from
the prior odds and the likelihood ratio. Ethnographers often assemble evi-
dence in a sequential manner drawing a line at the point when new evidence
does not alter conclusions to be drawn.
Dropping the assumption that the evidential statements are independent,
conditional on Be and c Be, does not materially alter the situation except
that LS must now acknowledge the pattern of dependence among the sub-
jective statements (Abell 2009b). Such dependencies are, of course, to be
expected when the evidential statements are obtained for a particular action
from multiple informants all involved in the same narrative.
Clearly, it would prove difficult for the ethnographer to estimate each of a
string of m likelihood ratios, be they independent or not. Thus, a direct
estimate of LS, rather than its component likelihood ratios, is perhaps all that
can be demanded.15 Be this as it may, once again why should the ethnogra-
pher go through this exercise at all? The answer is two-fold. First, as we have
observed the aggregation of evidential items is made explicit but, second,
differing estimates can be aggregated across ethnographers. So, alternative
ethnographers are each endowed with a disciplined framework within which
to debate their differing credibility assessments of informants’ statements.
From Subjective Statements Through Credible Beliefs to Justified
Belief in Causal Connections
If we now allow an inference, by a given ethnographer, from the subjectively
provided evidence to a “justified belief” in the probability of the actual
existence of the causally generated mechanism ðXc ! DXo ! Y Þ and label
this as hypothesis H and its absence as c H . We are now interested in:
oddsðH : c H js1; s2; . . . ; smÞ ¼ oddsðH : c HÞ  L; ð7Þ
where L ¼ Pðs1;s2; ... ;smjHÞ
Pðs1;s2; ... ;smj c HÞ.
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Thus, as per the above, the ethnographer estimates the likelihood ratio at
the aggregate level across all evidential statements. It important, however, to
understand the logical structure of such an inference, particularly how it
embodies the ethnographer’s credible beliefs which do not appear in the
equation. We are interested in how credible beliefs in the available evidence
do or do not license inference to the oddsðH : c H js1; s2; . . . ; smÞ.
It is convenient, however, given our above analysis to consider a single
item of evidence s, rather than m items and to drop the designation of the
ethnographer, e, thus reducing the complexity of the notation. We need to
examine L in this situation (which is, of course, distinct from LS defined
above). With this objective in mind:
PðsjHÞ ¼ Pðs;HÞ=PðHÞ
Pðsj c HÞ ¼ Pðs; c HÞ=Pð c HÞ ; ð9Þ
Pðs;HÞ ¼ Pðs;B;HÞ þ Pðs; c B;HÞ
Pðs; c HÞ ¼ Pðs;B; c HÞ þ Pðs; c B; c HÞ ; ð10Þ
Pðs;B;HÞ ¼ PðHÞPðBjHÞPðsjB;HÞ
P

s; c B;HÞ ¼ PðHÞPð c BjHÞPðsj c B;H

: ð11Þ
With similar expressions for Pðs;B; c HÞ and Pðs; c B; c HÞ. Thus,
substituting equation 10 in equation 9,
Pðs;HÞ ¼ PðHÞPðBjHÞPðsjB;HÞ þ PðHÞPð c BjHÞPðsj c B;HÞ
Pðs; c HÞ ¼ Pð c HÞPðBj c HÞPðsjB; c HÞ þ Pð c HÞPð c Bj c HÞPðsj c B; c HÞ :
And substituting (11) in (8), we get
PðsjHÞ ¼ PðBjHÞPðsjB;HÞ þ Pð c BjHÞPðsj c B;HÞ
Pðsj c HÞ ¼ PðBj c HÞPðsjB; c HÞ þ Pð c Bj c HÞPðsj c B; c HÞ ;
ð12Þ
Thus, our target,
L ¼ PðsjHÞ
Pðsj c HÞ ¼
PðBjHÞPðsjB;HÞ þ Pð c BjHÞPðsj c B;HÞ
PðBj c HÞPðsjB; c HÞ þ Pð c Bj c HÞPðsj c B; c HÞ :
ð13Þ
The aggregate estimate by the ethnographer of the ratio L is, thus, logi-
cally constituted from constituent likelihood ratios. In a deep analysis, these
could be estimated by the ethnographer to unpack L, but this would, of
course, be a rather demanding and is an unlikely empirical procedure except
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perhaps when differing ethnographers reach inconsistent conclusions about
L. Then, some unpacking may reveal wherein differences lie. The ethnogra-
pher’s estimate of the prior odds and likelihood ratio will of course depend
upon the depth of the encounter with the informant and the estimate of his or
her reliability, self-knowledge, and so on. Ethnographers may exhibit some
reluctance to make estimates of this sort, but if they venture to draw conclu-
sions about causal mechanism they may implicitly be doing so. If that is true,
why not make it explicit for all to observe what they are doing?
Meta-Ethnography
The above outlined analysis may generally surrender multiple ethnographic
estimates of the posterior odds for a given causal connection (i.e.,
oddsðH : c H j available evidenceÞ). In a narrative context, there may be
estimates for each such causal connection (i.e., the action nodes in the asso-
ciated and-DAG). How should the various estimates, for a given causal
connection, be aggregated into an overall estimation of the odds of the link?
The natural extension of the analysis, so far, is to adopt a Supra-Bayesian
method (Clemens andWinkler 1999), whereby a meta-ethnographer treats all
of the posterior odds of each of the primary ethnographers as providing
ethnographic evidence, alongside any prior she herself might entertain, then
makes an estimate of the likelihood ratios, and hence calculates her posterior
odds. This will of course involve all the unwieldy complications encountered
above in estimating both the independent or dependent likelihood ratios. It,
therefore, seems an unlikely aggregation candidate.
A linear pooling of the odds ratios of all ethnographers with equal weight-
ings which sum to 1 is probably more promising in this respect and where
there is no reason to elevate one ethnographer above another. This then
amounts to simple averaging of the posterior odds ratios across all the pri-
mary ethnographers. An alternative is a normalized geometric pooling also
with exponent weights when, once again, no primary ethnographer is given
priority over any others.
Ethnographers are scrupulously careful in comparing and contrasting (i.e.,
aggregating and separating) subjective reports in order to arrive at an estima-
tion of “what is going on.” There is, however, as far as we can see, no
available framework within which this procedure can be systematized. How-
ever, as we noted above, the Bayesian approach enables a common language
of odds, whereby comparisons may be made. Theories of probabilistic or
odds pooling usually require that any aggregation technique should surrender
unanimity (i.e., if all agree, then this becomes the aggregate value), event-
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wise independence (i.e., the aggregate only depends on the individual val-
ues), and Bayesian externality (i.e., it does not matter whether odds are
updated before or after aggregation). Should these properties be taken as
guides, on the meta-ethnographer’s behalf, for causal inference where the
basic evidence is subjective? Linear aggregation is unanimity preserving and
event-wise independent though fails to be externally Bayesian. Geometric
aggregation, on the other hand, is externally Bayesian and unanimity preser-
ving, but not event-wise independent (Dietrich and Spiekermann 2013).
We might start with a situation where all the primary ethnographers are in
possession of the same set of statements fsi1; si2; . . . ; simg. This could be
achieved either as a natural consequence of their research or by what is
sometimes called behavioral aggregation where the primary ethnographers
are brought together as a group where they share the statements they have
elicited in interaction with various informants. They will of course not neces-
sarily attribute the same credibility to identical statements, nor estimated
posterior odds of the causal link. However, behavioral aggregation usually
searches out unanimity of the aggregate estimate, if achieved, then this would
seem to provide the strongest grounds for inferring a causal link. Failure to
achieve unanimity using behavioral aggregation might, however, be taken to
invite either additional linear or geometrical aggregation. It is difficult, at this
stage, to advocate any particular aggregation technique—the issue warrants
further research, if the whole Bayesian framework toward causality is to be
taken seriously.
The Illustrative Empirical Example—A Further Look
Returning now to the illustrative empirical example introduced above. Both
subjective causal and counterfactual statements ðsiÞ were solicited from
five members of the governing body (including the one examined above)
of the producer cooperative in respect of the collective action in appointing
an independent manager. One of the five was the chairman of the governing
body (informant 1) and another was the ex-chairman (informant 2). The
first author of this article continues in the role of ethnographer. With some
prompting, the informants agreed upon the causally connected sets Xc and
Y.16 The ethnographer assumed that the prior odds of the credibility of the
five conjoined statements of subjective and counterfactual causality was
1 : 1 (see Note 12) and estimated the likelihood ratios of the credibility of
this evidence attributable to each informant. With the assumption of the
prior odds at 1:1, the likelihood ratios are then identical to the posterior
odds of the credibility of the evidence. Table 1 gives the credibility beliefs
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afforded by the ethnographer to each informant. In this case, the credibility
of each informant is separately estimated rather than the overall credibility
(equation 6).
The derived likelihoods of the causal hypothesis that
Xc ! Governing bodyDXo ! Y :
attributable each of the five informants by the ethnographer are depicted
in Table 2.
The credible evidence thus surrenders the odds that the causal link under
investigation is correctly inferred at an average 6:6:1 across informants.
Inspection of Tables 1 and 2 enables any audience of the research to appreci-
ate how this overall support for the causal link is constituted (i.e., socially
constructed) by the ethnographer and the informants. Recall that these cal-
culations can also be placed alongside the text of the subjective statements.17
Conclusion
We fully realize that many ethnographers will not find the contents of this
article at all congenial. Placing subjective evidence about causality within a
Bayesian framework runs counter to many of their precepts about remaining
entirely faithful to the actors own account of what they are doing. However,
if small-N studies are to aspire to reveal causal connections, then a systematic
framework enabling comparison across informants and perhaps ethnogra-
phers must be found. Currently, these procedures remain difficult to extract
from reported studies (Abend et al. 2013). The techniques we have outlined
Table 1. Estimates of the Credibility of Statements by Informants.[AQ4]
i ¼ 1 i ¼ 2 i ¼ 3 i ¼ 4 i ¼ 5
Lsi 10 : 1 10 : 1 5 : 1 8 : 1 4 : 1 Lsi ¼ 6:6 : 1
logLsi 2:30 2:30 1:61 2:08 1:39
Pm
i¼1logðLsiÞ ¼ 9:68
Table 2. Justified Belief in a Causal Relation.[AQ5]
i ¼ 1 i ¼ 2 i ¼ 3 i ¼ 4 i ¼ 5 Average
OddsðH : c Hjsi1; si2; . . . ; si5Þ 10 : 1 10 : 1 5 : 1 8 : 1 4 : 1 6:6 : 1
log

OddsðH : c Hjsi1; si2; . . . ; si5Þ

2:30 2:30 1:61 2:08 1:39 2:00
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here achieve precisely this, through the use of Bayesian inference. Only
in-depth applied work will show whether these sort of inference are intellec-
tually revealing.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.
ORCID iD
Ofer Engel https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9675-0599
Notes
1. The authors are far from conversant with all the details of ethnographic methods
but the article is written in a manner that tries to take seriously some of the critical
claims that ethnographers and others make about frequency-based statistical
methods in the social sciences whilst maintaining the aspiration to reap the clarity
benefits of formal explication.
2. Some readers may prefer the formulation where actions are named in terms of
their objectives. The connection between actions and their objectives has
attracted much attention from philosophers in terms of the logical connection
argument, namely that the connection is analytic and not contingent and therefore
not causal. However, we shall interpret it as causal as nothing is lost by doing so.
The following analysis could be pursued by substituting Y with Xo.
3. The possible complementary roles of ethnographic (case study) causality and
frequency-based causality will be taken up in a subsequent paper.
4. Attempts to formalize singular causality have been conducted by Hitchcock
(2007) and Cartwright (2017), among others.
5. Simple statements like these brush aside some of the complexities that might
arise because “doing Xo” covers both motivational/intentional and beliefs about
objectives ðY Þ, sometimes modeled as the practical syllogism (Abell 1987; Von
Wright 2004). Thus, the reasoning takes the form: The actor, in situation Xc,
intended Y, and the actor believed that doing Xo, in Xc, would result in (cause)
Y. Furthermore, it may be important to distinguish forbearing to do something and
not doing something. The former will be used to imply intention and, thus, con-
scious deliberation not to do, the latter not so. Clearly, we do not do all those things,
we could do on an occasion but probably only consciously think of a few of these.
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Note also since both Xc and Y stand for sets of conjoined events, the negation of a
set in a counterfactual statement implies that if any one of the conjoined elements
in the set is absent then the causal connection will be absent. Xc may perhaps be
conceived as comprising of INUS[AQ6] causal conditions (Mackie 1980).
6. Translating between the informants’ and ethnographers’ vocabularies raises
issues ignored in this article. In a single case, there is perhaps no good reason
for the ethnographer to impose terms, unlike in generalizing studies. Casual
empiricism suggests that objectives (Y) are easier to solicit than causal conditions
ðXcÞ. Prompting is often necessary to solicit the latter. The statements can also be
expressed in differing ways while still conveying essentially the same informa-
tion. We shall assume the alternative possible locutions (i.e., framing) are logi-
cally equivalent for the purposes of causal inference unless otherwise stated.
Furthermore, Xc may be given as the absence of Y. This allows that the absence
of states can be the causal prompt (Ragin 1987). It should be emphasized that the
use of symbols here (Xc and Y) should not be taken to imply that the analysis can be
carried out in terms of “variables,” the symbols are characteristically shorthand for
complex natural language descriptions. Furthermore, again casual empiricism has
revealed that actors may offer alternative causal mechanisms like: “I would also
have done Xo if Z” and “I would not have done Xo if neither Xc nor Z.” It is
imperative to observe that because narratives (see below) are depicted as “and” not
as “or” directed a-cyclic graphs, alternative causes are not covered. This is appro-
priate because in a single-case alternative causal mechanisms are not logically
possible. Although this would, in the recent past, have drawn a sharp line between
the old regression–based additive structural modeling and interaction structures,
with the movement to nonparametric modeling of DAGs this distinction falls away
(Morgan and Winship 2015; Pearl 2000[AQ7]).
7. It must be emphasized that the example is only a simplified illustrative model
introduced to facilitate an understanding of the analysis in this article. It is not
proffered as a definitive study and should not be interpreted as such.
8. Cooperative principles normally require that managers are appointed from within
the membership. Thus, recruiting an independent manager very much went
against established procedures.
9. Ethnographers have developed various methods to ascribe “truth values” to
assertions provided by informants (Cardano 2009). They have also discussed
how to adjudicate between alternative interpretations when confronted with con-
flicting evidence (Chandra 2014; Heider 1988). In what follows, we suggest a
formalized approach to these issues (compare with Heider 1988).
10. Ethnographers will at this stage in the argument no doubt feel uneasy about the
move from natural language statements (discourse) to probabilities. Clearly, we
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need to ask: What is the epistemic role of probability statements? The paramount
reason for moving from discourse to probabilities is that it affords the ethnogra-
pher a scaled mechanism for combining various items of evidence (see below).
Thus, rather than having a list of similar statements of varying credibility about
the causal connection under investigation, an aggregate estimate of their causal
probity can be constructed. Nevertheless, even if the move to probabilities is
intellectually sanctioned, there still remains a further puzzle as to their epistemic
status. Clearly, they cannot usually, but may be, derived from frequency con-
siderations on the ethnographer’s behalf. Should we assume that the ethnogra-
pher holds probabilities in mind? Perhaps this is reasonable if she or he is trained
to think in such a manner? Alternatively, probabilities may be interpreted as an
“as if” device enjoined in the practice of social science. The problem with the
latter is that as if assumptions are usually deemed appropriate when they facilitate
generalization across cases but such is not the prime objective of singular caus-
ality. (Generalization is, of course, involved across evidential items). Although
most ethnographers will resist any role for rational choice in the social sciences, it
is worth noting that the formulation of Bayesian inference based upon subjective
probabilities can be given a rational choice interpretation, whereby it is deemed
that utility maximizing individuals should follow the reasoning of Bayesian
inference (Howson and Urbach 2006). Indeed, the issue is somewhat deeper than
mere recommendation by virtue of the theorem which shows that preferences
with standard properties can always be associated with a probability distribution
(Maher 1993). Bayesian nets have been interpreted as a foundational model for
the “epistemic” interpretation of causal inference (Williamson 2005). However,
Bayesian narratives are quite distinct, though consistent with Bayesian nets. The
latter usually, though not invariably, depends upon frequency measures and
characteristically do not derive the actual causal links from subjective evidence
but rather from conditional probabilities between states (Xc and Y). Such condi-
tional probabilities can, of course, be derived from narrative connections, but the
causal conclusions are not derived in this manner.
11. There may be some contention about how to treat the hypothesis about a gen-
erative mechanism which connects Xc; DXo; andY . The subjective statements
provide evidence for all three components and their possible causal connections.
It would be possible to think independently about the credibility that any sub-
jective statements provide for each causal connection separately. The analysis
will, however, be pursued in terms of sets Xc and Y connected by DXo in the
spirit of the idea of a total generative causal mechanism.
12. We concentrate upon the odds ratio rather than, for instance, the difference in
posterior and prior odds PðBej evidenceÞ  PðBeÞ or the ratio PðBej evidenceÞ=
PðBeÞ, which might seem more intuitive measures. However, with these
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measures, the incremental impact of an item of evidence when the prior is near its
maximum of unity will be less than with the same item when the probability is
lower. The odds ratio allows the impact scale to vary from minus to plus infinity
which obviates this problem (Schum 1994).
13. Setting the prior odds at unity may appear inappropriate to many Bayesians and it
could be dropped in all that follows. However, there is perhaps some justification
to be found in ethnographic precepts for so doing. Ethnographic researchers are
often enjoined to engage in research without bringing any preconceived ideas to
the research site. Whether this is possible is, of course, very much a moot point;
but it does apparently invite the suppression of any prior odds one way or the
other that emight bring to the analysis. The precept does, we think, flow from the
assumption that much social phenomena is ultimately unique and therefore to
bring preconceived ideas to the research may distort a full understanding of
“what is going on” from the informant’s standpoint.
14. Heider (1988) discusses such disagreements between ethnographers and the
methodological puzzles that such disagreements pose.
15. The nature of this procedure is, from an inferential standpoint, rather important to
record because, if relaxed, the inferences would run from each item of evidence
to individual beliefs about the credibility of each informant’s statement. In that
case, any across informant statements about causality would arise in the inference
from these beliefs to the existence of a causal link (see below). It is straightfor-
ward to adjust the inferential models to credible beliefs in this manner.
16. In general, acquiring agreement on the contents of set Xc and Y across all chosen
informants is unlikely. The techniques outlined may then be used to test alter-
native hypotheses. This falls beyond the scope of this exploratory paper.
17. The causal and counterfactual statements are so similar across informants that
they are not reported here.
References
Abell, P. 1987. The Syntax of Social Life. The Theory and Method of Comparative
Narratives. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Abell, P. 1990. “Supporting Industrial Cooperatives in Developing Countries: Some
Tanzanian Experiences.” Economic and Industrial Democracy 11:483-504.
Abell, P. 2009a. “History, Case Studies, Statistics and Causal Inference.” European
Sociological Review 25:561-69.
Abell, P. 2009b. “A Case for Cases, Comparative Narratives in Sociological
Explanation.” Sociological Methods & Research 32:1-33.
Abend, G., C. Petrie, and M. Sauder. 2013. “Styles of Causal Thought.” American
Journal of Sociology 119:602-54.
Abell and Engel 19
Bennett, A. and J. Checkel, eds. 2015. Process Tracing in the Social Sciences: From
Metaphor to Analytic Tool. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
[AQ8]
Cardano. 2009. Ethnography and Reflexivity. Notes on the Construction of Objec-
tivity in Ethnographic Research. ELETTRONICO 1: 1-21. Retrieved (http://hdl.
handle.net/2318/75133).[AQ9]
Cartwright, N. 2017. “Single Case Causes: What Is Evidence and Why.” in Philoso-
phy of Science I Practice. Synthese Library (Studies in Epistemology, Logic
Methodology and Philosophy of Science), Vol. 379, edited by H. K. Chao and
J. Reiss. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.[AQ10]
Chandra, U. 2014. “Rashomon Revisited: Contending Narratives on a Gang Rape in
West Bengal.” Economic & Political Weekly 49:28-30.
Clemen, R. T. and R. L. Winkler. 1999. “Combining Probability Distributions from
Experts in Risk Analysis.” Risk Analysis 19:187-203.
Dietrich, F. and K. Spiekermann. 2013. “Independent Opinions? On the Causal
Foundations of Belief Formation and Jury Theorems.” Mind 122:655-85.
Elman, C., J. Gerring, and J. Mahoney. 2016. “Case Study Research: Putting Quant
into Qual” Sociological Methods & Research 45:375-91.
Goldthorpe, J. H. 2001. “Causation, Statistics and Sociology.” European Sociological
Review 17:1-20.
Hedstro¨m, P. 2005. Dissecting the Social: On the Principals of Analytical Sociology.
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Heider, K. G. 1988. “The Rashomon Effect: When Ethnographers Disagree.”
American Anthropologist 90:73-81.
Hitchcock, C. 2007. “Prevention, Preemption, and the Principle of Sufficient
Reason.” Philosophical Review 116:495-532.
Howson, C. and P. Urbach. 2006. Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach.
Peru, IL: Caris Publishing.
Mackie, J. L. 1980. The Cement of the Universe. Oxford, England: Oxford University
Press.
Maher, P. 1993. Betting on Theories. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University
Press.
Mahoney, J. 2000. “Strategies of Causal Inference in Small-N Analysis.” Sociologi-
cal Method and Research 29:387-424.
Mahoney, J. 2012. “The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences.”
Sociological Methods & Research 45:566-90.
Mahoney, J., G. Goertz, and C. C. Ragin. 2013. “Causal Models and Counterfactuals.”
inHandbook of Causal Analysis for Social Research, edited by Stephen L. Morgan.
New York: Springer.[AQ11]
20 Sociological Methods & Research XX(X)
Morgan, S. L. and C. Winship. 2015. Counterfactuals and Causal Inference: Methods
and Principles for Social Research. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press.
Pearl, J. 2009. Causality Models, Reasoning and Inference. Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press.
Ragin, C. C. 1987. The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and
Quantitative Strategies. San Francisco: University California Press.
Rohlfing, I. 2013. Case Studies and Causal Inference. London, England: Palgrave
MacMillan.
Rubin, D. B. 2005. “Causal Inference Using Potential Outcomes: Design, Modelling,
Decisions.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 100:322-31.
Schum, D. A. 1994. The Evidential Foundations of Probabilistic Reasoning.
Evanston, IL: North Weston University Press.
Small, M. L. 2013. “Causal Thinking and Ethnographic Research.” American Journal
of Sociology 19:597-604.
Von Wright, G. H. 2004. Explanation and Understanding. Cornell, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Williamson, J. 2005. Bayesian Nets and Causality: Philosophical and Computational
Foundations. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Author Biographies
[AQ1]
Abell and Engel 21
